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Abstract
Equilibrium problems provide a mathematical framework which includes opti-
mization, variational inequalities, fixed-point and saddle point problems, and
noncooperative games as particular cases. This general format received an in-
creasing interest in the last decade mainly because many theoretical and algo-
rithmic results developed for one of these models can be often extended to the
others through the unifying language provided by this common format. This
survey paper aims at covering the main results concerning the existence of equi-
libria and the solution methods for finding them.
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1. Introduction
In scientific contexts the term “equilibrium” has been widely used at least in
physics, chemistry, engineering and economics within different frameworks, re-
lying on different mathematical models. For instance, it may refer to physical or
mechanical structures, chemical processes, the distribution of traffic over com-
puter and telecommunication networks or over public roads (see, for instance,
[20, 32, 39, 85, 95, 103, 105]). In economics it often refers to production competi-
tion [31] or the dynamics of offer and demand [12], exploiting the mathematical
model of noncooperative games and the corresponding equilibrium concept by
Nash [89, 90].
This survey paper deals with those equilibrium problems which are relevant
in operations research and mathematical programming. Many problems involv-
ing equilibria can be modeled in this framework through different mathematical
models such as optimization, variational inequalities and noncooperative games
∗Corresponding author: Tel. +39 050 2212750 Fax. +39 050 2212726
Email addresses: giancarlo.bigi@di.unipi.it (Giancarlo Bigi),
marco.castellani@univaq.it (Marco Castellani), m.pappalardo@di.unipi.it (Massimo
Pappalardo), mpassacantando@di.unipi.it (Mauro Passacantando)
Preprint submitted to European Journal of Operational Research November 19, 2012
among others (see for instance [13]). In turn, these mathematical models share
an underlying common structure which allows to conveniently formulate them
in a unique format. Therefore, theoretical developments and algorithms devel-
oped for one of these models can be generally modified to cope with the others
through the common format in a unifying language. This format reads
find x∗ ∈ C such that f(x∗, y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C, (EP)
or equivalently
find x∗ ∈ argmin{ f(x∗, y) : y ∈ C },
where C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty closed set and f : Rn ×Rn → R is an equilibrium
bifunction, i.e. f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ C.
This general problem was named “equilibrium problem” by Blum and Oettli
[24], who stressed this unifying feature and provided a thorough investigation of
its theoretical properties. Until then, this format did not actually receive much
attention: Nikaido and Isoda characterized Nash equilibria as the solutions of
(EP ) for an appropriate auxiliary bifunction [93] but they did not consider the
problem itself in an independent fashion; Gwinner introduced it just as a tool
to develop a unified treatment of penalization techniques for optimization and
variational inequalities [44]; Antipin formulated an inverse optimization problem
as a noncooperative game and therefore in the (EP ) format via the Nikaido-
Isoda bifunction [7] and provided a solution method for the general problem in
[8, 9].
Indeed, equilibrium problems in the above format started to gain real interest
only after the publication of the seminal paper of Blum and Oettli. Actually, the
possibility to exploit results and algorithms developed for one class of problems
in another framework was not a novelty at all: this kind of bridge already
finds roots in the analytical development of variational inequalities through
the connection with optimization via complementarity problems. Anyway, a
large number of applications has been described successfully via the concept
of equilibrium solution and therefore many researchers devoted their efforts to
study (EP ). In fact, nowadays there is a good theory for equilibria and a rapidly
increasing number of algorithms for finding them.
In this paper we aim at reviewing two core issues up to the state of the
art: the existence of equilibria and the solution methods. In order to make the
paper as readable as possible, instead of presenting all the technical details of the
results, we propose a structured overview with different levels. In particular, the
existence results are divided into groups according to the required assumptions,
while the solution methods are classified depending on the kind of problems
which are solved at each iteration. We hope that this paper may serve as a
basis for future research and stimulate further interest in equilibrium problems.
1.1. Particular cases of (EP)
In this subsection we briefly show how some of the main mathematical mod-
els for equilibria can be formulated in the general format (EP ), and we recall
just a few of their recent applications.
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Optimization problems: finding a global minimum of a function ψ : Rn → R
over a closed set C ⊆ Rn amounts to solving (EP ) with
f(x, y) = ψ(y)− ψ(x).
Pareto optimization problems: given m real-valued functions ψi : Rn → R,
a weak Pareto global minimum of the vector function ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψm)
over a closed set C ⊆ Rn is any x∗ ∈ C such that for any y ∈ C there
exists an index i such that ψi(y) − ψi(x∗) ≥ 0. Finding a weak Pareto
global minimum amounts to solving (EP ) with
f(x, y) = max
i=1,...,m
[ψi(y)− ψi(x)].
Saddle point problems: given two closed sets C1 ⊆ Rn1 and C2 ⊆ Rn2 , a saddle
point of a function L : C1 × C2 → R is any x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) ∈ C1 × C2 such
that
L(x∗1, y2) ≤ L(x∗1, x∗2) ≤ L(y1, x∗2)
holds for any y = (y1, y2) ∈ C1×C2. Finding a saddle point of L amounts
to solving (EP ) with C = C1 × C2 and
f((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) = L(y1, x2)− L(x1, y2).
Complementarity problems and systems of equations: given a closed convex
cone C ⊆ Rn and a mapping F : Rn → Rn, the complementarity problem
asks to determine a point x∗ ∈ C such that 〈F (x∗), v〉 ≥ 0 for any v ∈ C,
i.e., F (x∗) ∈ C∗ where C∗ denotes the dual cone of C. The system of
equations F (x) = 0 is a special complementarity problem with C = Rn.
Solving the complementarity problem amounts to solving (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈F (x), y − x〉.
Variational inequality problems: given a closed set C ⊆ Rn and a mapping
F : Rn → Rn, the Stampacchia variational inequality problem asks to
determine a point x∗ ∈ C such that
〈F (x∗), y − x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C. (1)
Solving this problem amounts to solving (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈F (x), y − x〉.
If F : Rn ⇒ Rn is a set-valued mapping with compact values, then finding
x∗ ∈ C and u∗ ∈ F (x∗) such that
〈u∗, y − x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C,
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amounts to solving (EP ) with
f(x, y) = max
u∈F (x)
〈u, y − x〉.
Given two mappings F, g : Rn → Rn and a function h : Rn → (−∞,+∞],
another kind of generalized variational inequality problem [104] asks to
find a point x∗ ∈ Rn such that
〈F (x∗), y − g(x∗)〉+ h(y)− h(g(x∗)) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Rn.
Solving this problem amounts to solving (EP ) with C = Rn and
f(x, y) = 〈F (x), y − g(x)〉+ h(y)− h(g(x)).
Notice that the presence of g and h does not allow to formulate this
problem in the standard format (1).
Fixed point problems: given a closed set C ⊆ Rn, a fixed point of a mapping
F : C → C is any x∗ ∈ C such that x∗ = F (x∗). Finding a fixed point
amounts to solving (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈x− F (x), y − x〉.
If F : C ⇒ C is a set-valued mapping with compact values, then finding
x∗ ∈ C such that x∗ ∈ F (x∗) amounts to solving (EP ) with
f(x, y) = max
u∈F (x)
〈x− u, y − x〉.
Nash equilibrium problems: in a noncooperative game with p players, each
player i has a set of possible strategies Ki ⊆ Rni and aims at minimizing
a loss function fi : K → R with K = K1×· · ·×Kp. A Nash equilibrium is
any x∗ ∈ K such that no player can reduce its loss by unilateraly changing
its strategy, in formulas any x∗ ∈ K such that
fi(x
∗) ≤ fi(x∗(yi))
holds for any yi ∈ Ki and any i = 1, . . . , p, with x∗(yi) denoting the vector
obtained from x∗ by replacing x∗i with yi. Finding a Nash equilibrium
amounts to solving (EP ) with the so-called Nikaido-Isoda bifunction [93],
i.e.,
f(x, y) =
p∑
i=1
[fi(x(yi))− fi(x)] . (2)
On the contrary, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in the case
of jointly convex strategies (see [35]) cannot be formulated in the (EP )
format. Anyway, the solution set of (EP ) with the corresponding Nikaido-
Isoda bifunction coincides with the subclass of the so-called normalized
Nash equilibria.
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Inverse optimization problems: given a closed set C ⊆ Rn, m functions fi :
Rn → R and p functions gj : Rn → R, this problem asks to determine
a parameter λ∗ ∈ Rm+ such that at least one optimal solution x∗ of the
minimization problem
min
{ m∑
i=1
λ∗i fi(x) : x ∈ C
}
satisfies the constraints gj(x
∗) ≤ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , p. Actually, it is
equivalent to the Nash equilibrium problem with three players in which
the first player controls the x variables and aims at solving
min
{ m∑
i=1
λifi(x) : x ∈ C
}
,
the second player controls the auxiliary variables y and aims at solving
max
{ p∑
j=1
gj(x)yj : y ≥ 0
}
while the third player simply chooses a vector λ ∈ Rm+ or equivalently
minimizes a constant objective function over Rm+ . Therefore, also this
inverse optimization problem can be formulated in the (EP ) format via
the Nikaido-Isoda bifunction.
As showed above, many problems have been proposed and studied which
belong to the class of equilibrium problems. Due to the huge number of appli-
cations, it is not possible to cite all the corresponding references. We provide
some references to books or surveys on such topics (see [2, 15, 35, 36, 59] and
references therein) together with some recent papers about economic problems
[33, 46, 60, 61, 62, 73, 77, 79, 86, 87, 88], environmental problems [34, 42, 71],
and problems arising from Information and Communication Technologies [2, 3,
10, 11, 53, 94, 102, 111].
1.2. Organization of this paper
The paper is divided into two parts: Section 2 is devoted to existence results,
while Section 3 is devoted to solution methods.
Section 2 first recalls the well-known Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz The-
orem, which is a basic tool to prove the existence of solutions of an equilibrium
problem. Next, the most significant known existence results are divided into
three groups based on the assumptions they require. In Section 2.1 we state a
basic existence theorem and analyze the topological and algebraic ingredients
which are needed to prove it. Then, we describe how the basic existence theo-
rem can be extended by weakening some of its assumptions. Section 2.2 deals
with the existence results based on generalized monotonicity assumptions on
the bifunction f and their connections with the above mentioned basic theorem.
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Section 2.3 describes some results which do not need convexity assumptions on
the set C or on the bifunction f .
Section 3 describes the most significant known algorithms for finding equi-
libria and analyzes the assumptions which allow to obtain convergence results.
The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection 3.1 is devoted to meth-
ods based on successive convex optimization. The section includes methods
based on a fixed-point reformulation of the equilibrium problem, the so-called
extragradient methods, and descent methods based on gap or D-gap functions.
Subsection 3.2 concerns regularization methods based on successive approx-
imations of (EP ). The section covers the proximal point and the so-called
Tikhonov-Browder methods.
2. Existence results
Since the solution set S of an equilibrium problem can be given as the inter-
section of a family of sets, the so–called Three Polish Theorem [54] by Knaster,
Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz provides a powerful tool to achieve existence re-
sults for the solutions of equilibrium problems.
KKM-Theorem. Let C be a subset of Rn and T : C ⇒ Rn be a set–valued
map satisfying the following conditions:
(KKM1) T is a KKM–map, that is any point of the convex hull of any finite
set {x1, x2, . . . , xp} ⊆ C belongs at least to T (xi) for some i, i.e.,
conv {x1, x2, . . . , xp} ⊆
p⋃
i=1
T (xi),
(KKM2) T (x) is closed for each x ∈ C,
(KKM3) there exists x ∈ C such that T (x) is compact,
then ⋂
x∈C
T (x) 6= ∅.
This result was originally stated in Rn and later it was extended to the case
of an infinite–dimensional topological vector space by Ky Fan [37].
2.1. The classical results
The KKM-Theorem is fundamental for ensuring a sufficient condition for
the existence of solutions of (EP ). Indeed, let us consider the set–valued map
T (y) = {x ∈ C : f(x, y) ≥ 0}.
Since S is clearly the intersection of the above sets, i.e.,
S =
⋂
y∈C
T (y),
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we examine which assumptions on f and C are enough to satisfy the assumptions
of the KKM-Theorem. We recall that C is a closed set and f(x, x) = 0 for all
x ∈ C.
If C is bounded and f(·, y) continuous for every y ∈ C, then T (y) is com-
pact for every fixed y ∈ C and therefore Assumptions KKM2 and KKM3 hold.
Moreover, the convexity of C and of the functions f(x, ·) for every fixed x ∈ C
implies that T is a KKM-map (Assumption KKM1). Therefore, we get following
basic existence theorem for (EP ).
Basic existence theorem. Suppose that
(A1) C is convex,
(T1) C is bounded,
(A2) f(x, ·) is convex for each x ∈ C,
(T2) f(·, y) is continuous for each y ∈ C,
then S is nonempty.
As underlined above, the main ingredients of the previous result are four,
two of a topological character (the boundedness of C and continuity of the
functions f(·, y)) and two of an algebraic character (the convexity of C and of
the functions f(x, ·)).
Starting from this result, we show how it is possible to weaken these as-
sumptions. To our knowledge, the history of existence theorems for equilibrium
problems can be traced back to 1972 when Ky Fan [38] proposed a famous mini-
max result in a real Hausdorff topological vector space, which implies a stronger
result than the above basic existence theorem. His result is based on two simple
statements of fact. Since the upper semicontinuity of a function is equivalent to
the closedness of each its superlevel set, then Assumption T2 can be weakened
to the upper semicontinuity of f(·, y). Instead, Assumption A2 of convexity
of f(x, ·) can be weakened to the quasiconvexity of the functions f(x, ·) which
is equivalent to the convexity of their sublevel sets, and it implies that T is a
KKM–map.
The next step is to replace Assumption T1 with weaker conditions, which
clearly have to involve some suitable form of coercivity on f . The first result
was presented in [25]. Under the same assumptions of the Ky Fan result but
Assumption T1, the authors replaced the boundedness of C with the following
coercivity condition
∃ r > 0, ∃ y ∈ C with ‖y‖ ≤ r s.t.
f(x, y) < 0, ∀ x ∈ C with ‖x‖ > r, (3)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm, proving that the solution set S is
nonempty and bounded. Actually, the result was given in a real Hausdorff
topological vector space, which required to state the coercivity condition in a
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more complex form. Furthermore, the upper semicontinuity of f(·, y) can be
replaced by the weaker assumption
lim inf
x′→x
f(x′, y) ≤ f(x, y), ∀ x, y ∈ C
under this same coercivity assumption [6].
2.2. Results under generalized monotonicity
The existence of a point y ∈ C such that f(x, y) → −∞ as ‖x‖ → ∞ with
x ∈ C guarantees the coercivity assumption (3). In particular, this condition
holds if f(x, ·) is convex and f is strongly monotone, i.e., there exists γ > 0 such
that
f(x, y) + f(y, x) ≤ −γ‖x− y‖2, ∀x, y ∈ Rn. (4)
Indeed, fixed any y ∈ C, there exists α ∈ R such that
f(y, x) ≥ α‖y − x‖, ∀x ∈ Rn,
since f(y, ·) is convex and f(y, y) = 0. Hence, (4) implies
f(x, y) ≤ −γ‖x− y‖2 − α‖x− y‖ → −∞
as ‖x‖ → ∞ with x ∈ C. Moreover, the strong monotonicity of f ensures
that the equilibrium problem has exactly one solution within this framework.
Unfortunately, strong monotonicity is a sharp assumption. For instance, if
f describes an optimization or a saddle point problem, it is never satisfied.
Anyway, it paves the way towards a different approach for obtaining weaker
coercivity conditions.
One of the most common approaches to weaken the coercivity condition
(3) is based on strengthening the assumption of quasiconvexity of f(x, ·) while
introducing suitable conditions on f weaker than strong monotonicity.
The basic concept of monotonicity for bifunctions is an adaptation of the
well–known definition of monotonicity for variational inequalities. A bifunction
f is said to be monotone on C if
f(x, y) + f(y, x) ≤ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C.
This condition is satisfied by a large number of equilibrium problems, for in-
stance optimization and saddle point problems. If f describes the variational
inequality (1), then it is monotone on C if and only if the operator F is monotone
on C, i.e.,
〈F (x)− F (y), x− y〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C.
The corresponding concepts of strict monotonicity are defined analogously just
requiring strict inequalities to hold.
The crucial point for the analysis of coercivity conditions weaker than (3) is
based on the relationships between S and the solution set of the Minty equilib-
rium problem, which reads
find y∗ ∈ C such that f(x, y∗) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ C. (MEP )
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The Minty equilibrium problem was initially introduced for variational in-
equality [78] and its relevance to applications was pointed out in [43]. A well-
known result, formulated by Minty in [78], states the equivalence of the Minty
and Stampacchia variational inequalities under continuity and monotonicity as-
sumptions of the involved operator.
An analogous relationship holds between the solution set S of (EP ) and
the solution set M of (MEP ). Indeed, the inclusion S ⊆ M is an immediate
consequence of the monotonicity of f : if x∗ ∈ S, then it belongs also to M since
f(y, x∗) ≤ −f(x∗, y) for every y ∈ C. Actually, the inclusion holds whenever
f(x∗, y) ≥ 0 implies f(y, x∗) ≤ 0 for every y ∈ C. This leads to a weaker concept
of monotonicity introduced in [19]. A bifunction f is said to be pseudomonotone
on C if the implication
f(x, y) ≥ 0 =⇒ f(y, x) ≤ 0
holds for every x, y ∈ C. Clearly, every monotone bifunction is also pseu-
domonotone and pseudomonotonicity is sufficient to guarantee the inclusion.
The converse inclusion M ⊆ S holds if f(·, y) is upper semicontinuous for any
y ∈ C and f(x, ·) is explicitly quasiconvex for any x ∈ C, i.e., it is quasiconvex
and the inequality
f(x, ty1 + (1− t)y2) < max{f(x, y1), f(x, y2)}.
holds for any y1, y2 ∈ C with f(x, y1) 6= f(x, y2) and any t ∈ (0, 1). In the recent
years, the assumption of upper semicontinuity has been deeply weakened in [18]
introducing the concept of upper sign continuity. This concept is an adaption
of a similar one introduced in [45] for set–valued mappings. Actually, in this
case the inclusion holds just between the two sets of local solutions.
In short, pseudomonotonicity, explicit quasiconvexity and upper semiconti-
nuity imply S = M .
The equivalence between (EP ) and (MEP ) is the key tool for estabilish-
ing weaker coercivity conditions and the assumption of pseudomonotonicity is
often required for this reason. Roughly speaking, the skeleton of the proofs of
existence is usually the following: first the nonemptiness of M is established
applying KKM-Theorem to the set–valued map
T (x) = {y ∈ C : f(x, y) ≤ 0}.
Pseudomonotonicity and quasiconvexity are fundamental to show that T is a
KKM–map. Afterwards the inclusion M ⊆ S implies the nonemptiness of S.
Moreover, the quasiconvexity of f(x, ·) implies that T (x) is a convex set, and
therefore the reformulation of (MEP ) as the intersection of a family of convex
sets, i.e.,
M =
⋂
x∈C
T (x),
allows to reduce the Minty equilibrium problem to a so–called convex feasibility
problem [14].
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One of the first and most used coercivity conditions, which has been intro-
duced for pseudomonotone equilibrium problems, is the following:
∃ r > 0 s.t. ∀ x ∈ C with ‖x‖ > r,
∃ y ∈ C with ‖y‖ ≤ r s.t. f(x, y) < 0. (5)
To our knowledge, it was originally introduced in [52] for complementarity prob-
lems and later adapted to (EP ) [18]. This condition is weaker than the coercivity
condition (3). Following the scheme previously described, it is possible to prove
that if f is pseudomonotone and C is convex, condition (5) together with
(a) the upper semicontinuity of f(·, y) (or also the upper sign continuity),
(b) the lower semicontinuity of f(x, ·),
(c) the explicit quasiconvexity of f(x, ·)
imply the nonemptiness and boundedness of S. We observe that if f(x, ·) is
convex, conditions (b) and (c) are automatically satisfied. Moreover it is possible
to show that the coercivity condition (5) is, in a certain sense, equivalent to the
nonemptiness and the boundedness of S. More precisely, if (a) and (c) hold and
S is nonempty and bounded, then (5) holds [18].
It turns out that the coercivity condition (5) is quite strong, since it entails
also the boundedness of the solution set S. For this reason in [18] the authors
adapted to equilibrium problems the following coercivity condition which was
introduced for variational inequalities in [16]:
∃ r > 0 s.t. ∀ x ∈ C with ‖x‖ > r,
∃y ∈ C with ‖y‖ < ‖x‖ s.t. f(x, y) ≤ 0. (6)
The coercivity condition (6) is weaker than (5) and it is enough to achieve the
nonemptiness of S under the same assumptions (a), (b) and (c). Besides, condi-
tion (6) was compared with other coercivity conditions introduced in literature
(see [41, 110]) and it was proved that it is really the weakest [18]. Very recently
[65] a coercivity condition weaker than (6) has been proposed for existence of
solutions of (EP ). This condition works without any monotonicity assump-
tion on f but it requires the convexity of f(x, ·) instead of just the explicit
quasiconvexity.
An analogous result of equivalence between the nonemptiness of S and a
coercivity condition was proved in [47] for bifunctions such that f(x, ·) is pseu-
doconvex, which is a stronger property than the quasiconvexity but it is not
comparable with the explicit quasiconvexity. Nevertheless it is possible to prove
[47] that if f(·, y) is upper semicontinuous, f(x, ·) is pseudoconvex, and f is
pseudomonotone then S is nonempty if and only if the following condition holds
∀{xk} ⊆ C with ‖xk‖ → ∞, ∃ y ∈ C s.t.
f(xk, y) ≤ 0, for every sufficiently large k.
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In the last years quasimonotone equilibrium problems have been considered
[18]. We recall that the bifunction f is said to be quasimonotone on C if the
implication
f(x, y) > 0 =⇒ f(y, x) ≤ 0.
holds for every x, y ∈ C. Cleary, every pseudomonotone bifunction is also
quasimonotone. Unfortunately, quasimonotonicity is not enough to ensure the
equivalence between (EP ) and (MEP ). Nevertheless the quasimonotonicity of
f paired with the coercivity condition (6) ensures the nonemptiness of S pro-
vided that upper semicontinuity and quasiconvexity assumptions are strength-
ened [18].
2.3. Results without convexity
In order to avoid any assumption of convexity both for the constraint set C
and for the bifunction f , some authors (see for instance [1, 17, 72] and references
therein) proposed a different approach in which the existence of solutions for
(EP ) is obtained assuming that the bifunction f satisfies the following triangular
inequality
f(x, y) ≤ f(x, z) + f(z, y), ∀x, y, z ∈ C. (7)
The first results are a consequence of a generalization of the famous Ekeland’s
variational principle to the equilibrium problem. For instance, if f satisfies (7)
and C is bounded, the existence of a solution for (EP ) has been proved in [17]
along with the following further topological assumptions on f :
• lower semicontinuity and lower boundedness of f(x, ·) for any x ∈ C,
• upper semicontinuity of f(·, y) for any y ∈ C.
Moreover the same result holds if the boundedness of C is replaced by the
coercivity condition (6).
Following a different approach, the same results are achieved in [27], for
instance removing the assumptions of lower boundedness and upper semiconti-
nuity.
3. Solution methods
Throughout all this section we suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty closed
convex set and the equilibrium bifunction f is continuously differentiable and
f(x, ·) is convex for all x ∈ C. In this way we can describe solution methods for
(EP ) in a unified common framework. Actually, some methods simply require
that f is continuous (or even satisfies weaker continuity assumptions) and exploit
the subgradients of f(x, ·) instead of the gradient ∇yf of f with respect to the
second argument y.
It is worth remarking that this framework includes all the assumptions of the
basic existence theorem of Section 2.1 except for the boundedness of C. Indeed,
all the algorithms require it or alternatively additional assumptions implying
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one of the coercivity conditions of the previous section, so that the existence of
a solution is always guaranteed.
In this framework (EP ) is equivalent to the variational inequality
find x∗ ∈ C such that
〈∇yf(x∗, x∗), y − x∗〉 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C, (8)
in the sense that the soluton sets of the two problems actually coincide [26].
Therefore, any method for variational inequalities could be applied to solve
(EP ) through (8). For instance, projection methods for (8) have been developed
in [100, 101]. Clearly, all the assumptions required by algorithms for the operator
of the variational inequality must be satisfied by the gradient mapping G(x) =
∇yf(x, x).
Whenever f is pseudomonotone, (EP ) reduces through the equivalent Minty
equilibrium problem to finding a point in the intersection of a family of convex
sets. Therefore, any method for the so-called convex feasibility problem (see
[14]) could be applied to solve pseudomonotone equilibrium problems. For in-
stance, methods based on (gradient) projections [49] and analytic center cutting
plane techniques [99] have been developed.
All the other solution methods we review share a common feature: the
bifunction f is modified by adding some (parametric) term, generally in order
to improve the properties of the bifunction which is actually managed by the
algorithms. We classify the solution methods into two large families according
to the nature of the additional term: the first family is based on optimization
techniques as each iteration of the algorithms requires the solution of at least one
optimization problem, while the second is based on successive approximations
of (EP ) with equilibrium problems with better properties.
3.1. Methods based on successive optimization
One possible approach to solve (EP ) through the solution of a sequence
of optimization problems is due to its reformulation as a fixed point problem.
Indeed, since f(x, x) = 0, x∗ solves (EP ) if and only if it is a fixed point of the
multivalued map
Φ(x) = argmin{ f(x, y) : y ∈ C },
i.e., x∗ ∈ Φ(x∗). Therefore, the fixed point iterative scheme xk+1 ∈ Φ(xk) could
be exploited, solving one convex optimization problem per iteration. Actually,
there are a few reasons why this approach is not effective: unless C is bounded,
Φ might not be defined everywhere; even where it is defined, it is generally
multivalued and thus rules to choose among different solutions would be needed;
finally, even if it is single-valued, it is not necessarily continuous.
If Φ is defined on C, then the value function
ϕ(x) = −f(x,Φ(x)) = −min{ f(x, y) : y ∈ C }
allows to reformulate (EP ) as a constrained optimization problem. In fact, ϕ is
a gap function, i.e., it is non negative on C and x∗ ∈ C solves (EP ) if and only
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if ϕ(x∗) = 0 [76]. Therefore, (EP ) is equivalent to finding the global minima of
ϕ over C. Anyway, ϕ obviously inherits all the troubles of Φ.
The auxiliary principle provides an adequate technique to overcome all the
above drawbacks. Given any α > 0, consider the equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C such that
f(x∗, y) + α||y − x∗||2/2 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C. (EPα)
Indeed, it is equivalent to the original equilibrium problem as the solution sets
of (EPα) and (EP ) coincide [75]. Therefore, algorithms for (EP ) can exploit
all the properties that the additional term ||y − x||2 provides to the bifunction
of (EPα). In fact, the corresponding argmin function
Φα(x) = argmin{ f(x, y) + α||y − x||2/2 : y ∈ C }
is defined everywhere and single-valued for any x ∈ Rn since the objective
function of the inner optimization problem is strongly convex. Moreover, the
corresponding value function
ϕα(x) = −min{ f(x, y) + α||y − x||2/2 : y ∈ C }
is a continuously differentiable gap function for (EPα) and thus also for (EP ).
Most algorithms actually solve directly (EPα) for some fixed α > 0 or at
most consider a sequence of parameters αk bounded above and away from 0,
while just a few solve (EP ) exploiting a whole range of parameters for αk ↓ 0
or αk ↑ +∞. While any fixed α satisfying the requirements of the algorithms
provides a good choice, concrete strategies for the choice of the sequence αk are
compared in [21, 22, 23].
Finally, it is worth remarking that the quadratic regularization term ‖y−x‖2
can be replaced by any Bregman distance [29, 40, 51], i.e. any
D(x, y) = g(y)− g(x)− 〈∇g(x), y − x〉,
where g : Rn → Rn is a differentiable strongly convex function (other than the
squared norm), or by a more general bifunction [75, 76] preserving the good
features of the auxiliary problem which have been descrived above.
3.1.1. Fixed point methods
The fixed point approach can be effectively exploited to solve (EP ), applying
the iterative scheme to (EPα) for some fixed α > 0. In fact, the fixed point
iteration xk+1 = Φα(x
k) is well defined and it amounts to find the unique
optimal solution xk+1 of the convex optimization problem
min{ f(xk, y) + α||y − xk||2/2 : y ∈ C }. (9)
The whole sequence {xk} converges to the unique solution of (EP ) provided
that f is strongly monotone with constant γ and there exist c1, c2 > 0 such that
the triangular inequality
f(x, y) + f(y, z) ≥ f(x, z)− c1||x− y||2 − c2||y − z||2 (10)
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holds for all x, y, z ∈ C, while the above parameters satisfy the inequalities
γ > c1 and 2c2 ≤ α [75]. The rate of convergence of the algorithm is linear [84],
in fact
||xk+1 − x∗|| ≤
√
K ||xk − x∗||
holds with K = [1− 2(γ− c1)/α], where x∗ is the unique solution of (EP ). The
rate of contraction
√
K can be improved under a triangular condition stronger
than (10), solving two strongly convex problems at each iteration instead of
a single one [98]: the objective function of the first depends upon the points
obtained in all the previous iterations while the second is the usual fixed point
iteration (9).
It is worth noting that the uniqueness of the solution follows from the strong
monotonicity assumption, which is rather restrictive. Actually, convergence can
be achieved also if f is pseudomonotone whenever (10) holds with c2 = 0, f(x, ·)
is Lipschitz continuous on C uniformly in x, i.e., there exists L > 0 such that
|f(x, y)− f(x, z)| ≤ L||y − z||, ∀ x, y, z ∈ C,
and α is replaced by a sequence {αk} such that the series whose terms are
1/α2k is convergent [91]. Actually, both the above sets of conditions on f are
particular cases of a more general set of conditions ensuring convergence [91],
which moreover are satisfied if f(x, y) = 〈F (x), y − x〉 and the operator F is
co-coercive on C, i.e., there exists γ > 0 such that
〈F (y)− F (x), y − x〉 ≥ γ||F (x)− F (y)||2, ∀ x, y ∈ C.
Furthermore, this fixed point approach can exploit also bundling techniques
by replacing the convex function f(xk, ·) in (9) with suitable linear approxima-
tions in such a way that the fixed point iteration asks for the solution of an
easier optimization problem [91].
Another family of methods for solving (EP ) can be developed applying the
fixed point approach to the variational inequality (8). Actually, in order to
exploit the basic iterative scheme rather restrictive assumptions such as mono-
tonicity and Lipschitz properties of the gradient mapping G(x) = ∇yf(x, x) are
needed. Anyway, they can be dropped and convergence can be achieved under
the (pseudo)monotonicity of f if the fixed point iteration
yk = argmin{ 〈∇yf(xk, xk), y − xk〉+ α||y − xk||2/2 : y ∈ C },
or equivalently yk = piC(x
k − α−1∇yf(xk, xk)), i.e., yk is the projection of
xk − α−1∇yf(xk, xk) onto C, is combined with a suitable line search along the
direction yk − xk and appropriate further projections [55, 70, 106]. Chosen the
parameters θ, β, τ ∈ (0, 1), the line search identifies a point zk = xk+ θβm(yk−
xk) where m is the smallest non-negative integer such that
f(zk, xk) ≥ τθβm〈∇yf(xk, xk), xk − yk〉. (11)
In turn, zk provides the hyperplane
Hk = { x ∈ Rn : 〈∇yf(zk, xk), xk − x〉 = f(zk, xk) }
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which strictly separates xk from the solution set of (EP ). Therefore, the next
iterate is obtained projecting onto C the projection of xk onto Hk, i.e.,
xk+1 = piC(x
k − ηf(zk, xk)∇yf(zk, xk)/||∇yf(zk, xk)||2) (12)
with η = 1. Actually, the method converges also if the projection onto Hk is
somehow relaxed taking any η ∈ (0, 2). Moreover, xk+1 can be alternatively
chosen as a convex combination of the projection in (12) and xk. It is worth
noting that if the functions f(·, y) were concave, and therefore the gap function
ϕ were convex, and zk ∈ Φ(xk), then (12) would be a step of a relaxation
subgradient method for the minimization of ϕ.
3.1.2. Extragradient methods
In order to weaken strong monotonicity to pseudomonotonicity, another ap-
proach relies on a double step procedure: the fixed point iteration
x¯k = argmin{ f(xk, y) + α||y − xk||2/2 : y ∈ C }
is taken as a predictive intermediate step followed by the correction step
xk+1 = argmin{ f(x¯k, y) + α||y − xk||2/2 : y ∈ C }.
The whole sequence {xk} converges to a solution of (EP ) provided that C is
bounded, f is pseudomonotone and there exists Λ > 0 with α ≥ Λ such that
|f(v, w)− f(x,w)− f(v, y) + f(x, y)| ≤ 2Λ ||v − x|| ||w − y|| (13)
holds for all v, w, x, y ∈ C [40]. Notice that (13) means that the functions
f(v, ·)−f(x, ·) are Lipschitz with constant 2Λ||v−x|| and the functions f(·, w)−
f(·, y) are Lipschitz with constant 2Λ||w − y||. Since C is bounded, these con-
ditions surely hold if f is twice continuously differentiable. The boundedness
assumption on C can be removed provided that f satisfies the triangular con-
dition (10), instead of (13), and α ≤ min{1/2c1, 1/2c2} [97]. Furthermore,
when C is a polyhedron, the regularization term ||x−y||2 can be replaced by an
interior-quadratic term to perform unconstrained minimization [92]: this term
is actually composed of two parts, one plays the role of a barrier function to keep
the iterates xk in the interior of C while the other is a quadratic convex regu-
larization function which exploits the linear description of C. In case C = Rn+
the usual regularization term can be used along with the barrier part [4].
In order to drop the triangular condition (10), the correction step can be
replaced by a suitable line search along the direction x¯k − xk and a double
projection [92, 97]. Chosen β ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 2), the line search identifies a
point zk = xk + βm(x¯k − xk) where m is the smallest non-negative integer such
that
f(zk, xk)− f(zk, x¯k) ≥ ηα||xk − x¯k||2/2, (14)
and the next iterate is obtained projecting onto C the projection of xk onto the
separating hyperplane Hk just like in the combined relaxation method described
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at the end of the previous subsection. It is worth noting that the line searches
(11) and (14) are different as they relate to different predictive steps but they
both aim at separating strictly the current iterate from the solution set of (EP ).
Alternatively, if C has a nonempty interior, it is possible to replace the
predictive step with the following projection
x¯k = piC
x¯+ α−1 k−1∑
j=1
∇yf(xj , xj)

where x¯ belongs to the interior of C, and replace also xk by x¯k in the correction
step [96]. In this way the centroid of the correction iterates, i.e., (x1+· · ·+xk)/k,
converges to a solution of (EP ) provided that f is monotone and the gradient
mappings ∇yf(x, ·) are Lipschitz continuous uniformly in x for some constant
L ≤ α.
3.1.3. Descent methods
As already explained at the beginning of Section 3.1, the gap function ϕα
allows to reformulate (EPα), and thus (EP ), as a constrained optimization
problem, whose global minima are indeed the solutions of the two equilibrium
problems. Though ϕα is continuously differentiable, in general it is not convex
and therefore finding its global minima is not an easy task.
One possibility to overcome this difficulty is to consider assumptions which
guarantee that any stationary point of the minimization problem
min{ ϕα(x) : x ∈ C } (15)
is actually a global minimum, and thus solves (EP ). This “stationarity prop-
erty” holds if f is strictly ∇–monotone on C (see [21, 76]), i.e.,
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 > 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C with x 6= y, (16)
while it does not hold if f is ∇–monotone on C, i.e., the left-hand side of (16)
is just greater or equal to 0. Actually, no relationship holds between these
conditions and the monotonicity assumptions which have been exploited in the
previous sections. Anyway, they can be considered some kind of monotonicity
too: in fact, f is surely (strictly) ∇–monotone on C if the mappings ∇xf(x, ·)+
∇yf(x, ·) are (strictly) monotone on C for any x ∈ C.
Strict ∇-monotonicity guarantees also that Φα(x)− x is a descent direction
for ϕα at any non-stationary point x (see [21, 76]). Therefore, a basic descent
method can be devised moving away from a non-stationary point xk along the
direction dk = Φα(x
k)−xk with a suitable stepsize tk ∈ (0, 1] to obtain the new
iterate xk+1 = xk + tkd
k. Notice that, due to the choice of the stepsize, xk+1 is
a convex combination of xk and Φα(x
k), and hence belongs to C.
If f is strictly ∇–monotone and C is bounded, then this descent method
with the exact line search
tk ∈ arg min{ ϕα(xk + tdk) : t ∈ [0, 1] }
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generates a bounded sequence {xk} such that any of its limit points solves
(EP) [76]. An Armijo-type inexact line search can be considered choosing the
stepsize tk = β
m with β ∈ (0, 1) and m being the smallest nonnegative integer
such that
ϕα(x
k + βm dk) ≤ ϕα(xk)− θ βm ‖dk‖2,
with θ ∈ (0, 1). Convergence is guaranteed provided that C is bounded, f is
strongly ∇–monotone with constant γ > 0, i.e.,
〈∇xf(x, y) +∇yf(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ γ‖y − x‖2, ∀ x, y ∈ C,
and θ < γ [28, 69, 76].
If C is not bounded, some additional assumptions on f are needed to obtain
the boundedness of the sequence {xk}, which is a key property to achieve con-
vergence. Whenever the value of the gap function ϕα provides an error bound
for the unique solution x∗ of (EP ), i.e., there exists σ > 0 such that
ϕα(x) ≥ σ‖x− x∗‖2, ∀ x ∈ C, (17)
the sequence {xk} is bounded since the sequence of values {ϕα(xk)} is decreas-
ing. The error bound (17) holds if f is strongly monotone [76] or if ∇xf and
∇yf are Lipschitz continuous and G(x) = ∇yf(x, x) is strongly monotone [28],
i.e., there exists γ > 0 such that
〈G(x)−G(y), x− y〉 ≥ γ||x− y||2,
or if the mappings ∇yf(·, y) are strongly monotone with the same constant γ
for all y ∈ C [66, 69]. Therefore, the descent method (with exact or inexact
line search) converges also in case C is not bounded if any of the three above
additional assumptions holds too.
A descent method which does not require the strict ∇–monotonicity of f
can be devised relying on the concavity-type condition
f(x, y) + 〈∇xf(x, y), y − x〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x, y ∈ C, (18)
which is indeed satisfied if f(·, y) is concave for all y ∈ C. Moreover, it
implies ∇–monotonicity but it is neither stronger nor weaker than strict ∇–
monotonicity, and it does not guarantee the stationarity property for (15). Any-
way, this concavity-type assumption paired with the boundedness of C guaran-
tees that Φα(x) − x is a descent direction for ϕα at any x ∈ C which does not
solve (EP ), provided that α is small enough [21]. This property provides the
key idea of the method: if Φα(x
k) − xk is a descent direction for ϕα at the
current iterate xk, then a (inexact) line search is performed, while otherwise
the value of α is decreased, for instance according to some contraction factor.
Convergence is achieved under (18) and the boundedness of C [21].
The evaluation of ϕα at a given point x ∈ Rn could be computationally
expensive if the description of C involves nonlinear convex constraints, i.e.,
C = { y ∈ D : ci(y) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m }
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where D is a polyhedron and ci : Rn → R are nonlinear convex functions. If
the ci’s are (continuously) differentiable, linearizing these constraints around x
means replacing C by the outer polyhedral approximation
P (x) = { y ∈ D : ci(x) + 〈∇ci(x), y − x〉 ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m }.
In fact, C ⊆ P (x) ⊆ D. Modifying the inner optimization problem defining
ϕα(x) in this way leads to the function
φα(x) = −min{ f(x, y) + α||y − x||2/2 : y ∈ P (x) },
which is indeed a new gap function for (EP ) [22] and moreover the computation
of its values amounts to minimize a strongly convex function subject to linear
constraints only. Anyway, there is no longer any guarantee that the unique
minimizer of φα(x) belongs to C and hence the descent procedure may fail
to produce a new iterate belonging to C. Therefore, the introduction of a
penalization term and procedures to control the penalization parameter are
needed. Whenever D is bounded, convergence is achieved provided that f is
strictly ∇-monotone [23] or satisfies the concavity-type condition (18) [22].
Gap functions can be exploited also to reformulate (EP ) as an unconstrained
optimization problem. The approach is based on a pair of gap functions which
provide the so-called D-gap function
ϕαβ(x) = ϕα(x)− ϕβ(x),
where 0 < α < β. Indeed, the global minima of the unconstrained minimization
problem
min{ ϕαβ(x) : x ∈ Rn } (19)
coincide with the solutions of (EP ) (see [67, 107]). Clearly, ϕαβ inherits the
differentiability properties of ϕα and ϕβ but in general it is not convex (just like
ϕα and ϕβ), thus it could be difficult to find a global minimum.
However, if the mappings ∇xf(x, ·) +∇yf(x, ·) are strictly monotone on Rn
for any x ∈ Rn, then each stationary point of ϕαβ is actually a global minimum
of (19), and thus solves (EP) [107]. Actually, descent methods for ϕαβ require
stronger assumptions: if the mappings ∇xf(x, ·) are strongly monotone with
the same constant γ > 0 for all x ∈ Rn and uniformly Lipschitz continuous,
then there exists ρ > 0 such that ϕαβ and the corresponding argmin function
Φαβ = Φα − Φβ satisfy
〈∇ϕαβ(x),Φαβ(x) + ρs(x)〉 ≤ −γ(‖Φαβ(x)‖+ ρ‖s(x)‖)2/2 (20)
for all x ∈ Rn, where s(x) = α[x − Φα(x)] − β[x − Φβ(x)] (see [30, 67]). The
stationarity of a given point xk is equivalent to Φαβ(x
k) = 0 and s(xk) = 0.
If this is not the case, then (20) guarantees that dk = Φαβ(x
k) + ρs(xk) is
a descent direction and an inexact line search can be performed along this
direction. The resulting method converges provided that the sequence {xk} is
bounded [30, 67]. Since the sequence of values {ϕαβ(xk)} is decreasing, it is
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enough to guarantee that the sublevel sets of ϕαβ are bounded: this is true if
∇yf is Lipschitz continuous and G(x) = ∇yf(x, x) is strongly monotone [30, 67]
or if the mappings ∇yf(·, y) are strongly monotone with the same constant for
all y ∈ C [108].
Another descent method based on the D-gap function ϕαβ relies on the same
direction dk = Φα(x
k)− xk which is exploited also by the descent methods for
ϕα: if ϕαβ(x
k + dk) ≤ ηϕαβ(xk) holds for some fixed parameter η ∈ (0, 1), the
new iterate is xk+1 = xk+dk while otherwise an inexact line search along either
dk or −∇ϕαβ(xk) is performed. The method converges to a solution of (EP )
provided that the mappings ∇xf(x, ·) are strictly monotone for any x ∈ Rn and
∇yf(·, y) are strongly monotone with the same constant for all y ∈ C [108, 109].
3.2. Regularization methods
Regularization methods for equilibrium problems rely on a well-known solu-
tion scheme already developed for nonlinear equations, optimization problems
and variational inequalities. The key idea is to solve a sequence of auxiliary
equilibrium problems whose solutions converge to a solution of (EP ). More
precisely, at the k-th iteration any regularization method finds an exact or ap-
proximate solution of the auxiliary equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C such that
f(x∗, y) + αk〈x∗ − uk, y − x∗〉 ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C, (EPk)
where αk > 0 and u
k ∈ Rn are the parameters whose choice determines the
different algorithms. The additional term is called regularizing because it allows
to strengthen the monotonicity and ∇-monotonicity properties of the original
bifunction f . In fact,
fk(x, y) := f(x, y) + αk 〈x− uk, y − x〉
is strongly monotone if f is monotone and strongly ∇-monotone if f is ∇-
monotone. All the methods described in Section 3.1 can be applied to solve
the auxiliary problems. The sequence of the solutions of the auxiliary prob-
lems converges to a solution of (EP ) under suitable generalized monotonicity
or coercivity assumptions on f .
In the following we classify the regularization methods into two subclasses:
the proximal point and the Tikhonov-Browder methods. In the first subclass
the parameter uk depends upon the previous iterate(s) and the parameters αk
are kept fixed (or bounded above and away from zero) while in the second uk
is independent from the previous iterates and αk ↓ 0.
3.2.1. Proximal Point Methods
The basic version of the proximal point method (shortly PPM) asks to find
an exact solution xk of the auxiliary equilibrium problem (EPk) with αk = α for
some fixed α > 0 while the previous iterate xk−1 provides the other parameter,
i.e., uk = xk−1. If f is monotone, then each auxiliary problem has a unique
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solution since fk is strongly monotone (see Section 2.1), and the sequence {xk}
converges to a solution of (EP ) [80]. Moreover, if f is θ-conditioned, i.e. there
exist two parameters γ > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1] such that
−f(x, piS(x)) ≥ γ dist(x, S)θ, ∀ x ∈ C,
where S is the solution set of (EP ) and dist(x, S) denotes the distance of x from
S, then convergence is actually achieved in a finite number of iterations [82].
Since the auxiliary problems cannot be actually solved exactly, inexact ver-
sions of PPM are essential in the development of implementable algorithms.
One way to consider inexact PPMs is to add an approximation error εk to
the bifunction fk so that any solution of the approximated auxiliary problem
satisfies
fk(x
k, y) ≥ −εk, ∀ y ∈ C.
With the same choice of parameters of the exact case, the sequence {xk} gen-
erated by this inexact PPM converges to a solution of (EP ) if f is monotone
on C and the series whose terms are εk is convergent [80]. Taking u
k as a
particular linear combination of the two previous iterates xk−2 and xk−1, i.e.,
uk = xk−1 + βk (xk−1 − xk−2) for some βk ∈ [0, 1), the convergence of the inex-
act PPM is guaranteed if f is monotone and the parameters αk, βk, εk satisfy
suitable technical conditions [81]. This last method can be further extended con-
sidering auxiliary problems which are defined on convex outer approximations
of C [5].
Another way to develop inexact PPMs relies on the approximation of a
solution vk of the auxiliary problem (EPk) with a given accuracy εk, i.e., the
computation of some xk ∈ C such that ‖xk − vk‖ ≤ εk. Taking αk = α for
some fixed α > 0 and uk = xk−1, the sequence {xk} converges to a solution
of (EP ) provided that f is pseudomonotone, each auxiliary problem admits
at least one solution and the series whose terms are εk is convergent [56]. In
case the Minty equilibrium problem admits at least one solution but f is not
necessarily pseudomonotone, the sequence {xk} admits limit points and all of
them solve (EP ) [56]. Since the accuracy of the approximate solution of the
auxiliary problems has to be controlled, some further assumptions on f may
provide the required error bound. For instance, if f is weakly monotone, i.e.,
there exists θ > 0 such that
f(x, y) + f(y, x) ≤ θ‖x− y‖2, ∀ x, y ∈ C,
then the bifunctions fk of the auxiliary problems are strongly monotone with
constant α− θ whenever α is chosen greater than θ. In this case each auxiliary
problem admits a unique solution and the corresponding gap function allows to
estimate the distance from the solution (see also Section 3.1.3).
Considering a regularization term which depends only upon a subset of the
variables, a partial version of the latter inexact PPM can be also developed [58].
A further kind of inexact PPMs exploits the auxiliary problem (EPk) with
uk = xk−1 + ek for some arbitrary error vector ek whose norm is bounded by
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a suitable function of the available data at the current iteration. The solution
of (EPk) and the error vector e
k are used to build a hyperplane Hk separat-
ing xk−1 from the solution set of (EP ), and the new iterate xk is obtained
either projecting xk−1 onto Hk or making a step from xk−1 towards Hk. The
convergence of these methods is based on the weak monotonicity and the pseu-
domonotonicity of f [48]. Notice that these methods allow for constant relative
errors in the auxiliary problems unlike the methods previously recalled, which
require an increasing accuracy (up to exactness in the limit).
In the case of infinite dimensional spaces, the weak convergence of several
methods mentioned above has been proved in Hilbert spaces [50, 80, 81, 82]
and Banach spaces [48, 74]. On the other hand, the strong convergence of some
methods has been analyzed in [74, 80, 82].
3.2.2. Tikhonov-Browder methods
The basic version of the Tikhonov-Browder method asks to find an exact
solution xk of the auxiliary problem (EPk) with u
k = 0 and it considers a
sequence αk ↓ 0. If f is monotone, then each auxiliary problem admits a unique
solution and {xk} converges to the solution of (EP ) having minimal norm [83].
More in general, if the parameters uk are all taken equal to a given vector u,
then the sequence {xk} converges to the Euclidean projection of u onto the
solution set of (EP ).
Since the auxiliary problems can not be solved exactly in practice, an ap-
proximate computation of the iterates is required. For instance, if vk is an exact
solution of the auxiliary problem (EPk) of the basic Tikhonov-Browder method
and ‖xk − vk‖ ≤ εk, then also the sequence {xk} converges to the element of
minimal norm of the solution set of (EP), provided that εk ↓ 0. Similarly to the
case of PPMs, the error εk can be checked using the value of the gap function
associated to the auxiliary problem (see Section 3.1.3).
As already mentioned, all the solution methods discussed in Section 3.1 can
be exploited to approximate the solution of each auxiliary problem. In partic-
ular, descent methods based on gap and D-gap functions have been explicitly
considered [64, 68].
In order to provide better approximations of the initial problem, non quadratic
regularization terms can be exploited. Considering a suitable strongly monotone
bifunction in place of the quadratic term 〈x− uk, y − x〉, this modified version
of the basic Tikhonov-Browder method is convergent under the monotonicity of
f [64, 68]. Considering a regularization term which depends only upon a subset
of the variables, a partial version of the method can be also developed [57].
In order to drop any monotonicity assumption on f , the key assumption to
guarantee convergence is a coercivity condition more general than (6), which
exploits a continuously differentiable and strongly convex function real-valued
µ [63]. One method replaces the usual quadratic regularization term with
〈∇µ(x), y − x〉. The coercivity condition guarantees that (EP ) and all the
auxiliary problems admit at least one solution. Moreover, the sequence gener-
ated by the method has limit points and all of them solve (EP ) [63]. Taking
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µ(x) = ‖x‖2 this result allows to prove the convergence of the basic Tikhonov-
Browder under the coercivity condition (6).
Another method uses µ(y) − µ(x) as the regularization term and the same
convergence result of the previous method holds [63]. However, this new term
helps to improve the convexity properties of the auxiliary problems but not
the monotonicity properties. In fact, since f(x, ·) is convex then fk(x, ·) is
strongly convex, while if f is monotone then fk is also monotone but not nec-
essarily strongly monotone. Even more general coercivity conditions can be
exploited [65].
Actually, in order to make these two last methods implementable, some ad-
ditional monotonicity assumptions on f are needed to control the approximation
of the solutions of the auxiliary problems exploiting the methods described in
Section 3.1.
4. Conclusions
Due to the increasing relevance of equilibria in many application fields, a
large number of papers on equilibrium problems has been published. We focused
on two of the most important issues: existence of solutions and algorithms
for finding them. Among others relevant issues we recall duality and stability
and sensitivity of solutions. A related topic, which recently is getting a lot
of attention, deals with algorithms aiming at finding a common solution of an
equilibrium problem and other variational problems.
Though we believe that existence and algorithms for equilibria are mature
issues for a review, there are still challenging open problems which are worthy of
being investigated. Concerning existence, almost all the known results require
that f(x, ·) is quasiconvex. Nevertheless, quasiconvexity is not always met es-
pecially in problems arising from real-life applications. Therefore, some efforts
should be devoted to investigating the existence of solutions for problems in
which quasiconvexity does not hold.
Algorithmic approaches have usually been developed relying on the convex-
ity of f(x, ·), since this assumption allows to easily exploit convex optimization
as a basic tool. We believe that some efforts should be devoted to the devel-
opment of algorithms which guarantee convergence without such a condition.
Analogously, methods which do not require any monotonicity-type assumption
on f are an engaging topic which has not been tackled so far: it is very likely
that for equilibria monotonicity marks the same watershed that convexity is for
optimization.
Reviewing literature about algorithms for (EP ), a question naturally arises
on how to select the most suitable algorithm for a given problem. Valuable
comparison between different algorithms would require intensive computational
studies in which different approaches are tested on a common test-bed and their
performances are compared. Indeed, it is a wide research topic which still needs
and deserves to be thoroughfully investigated.
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